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How this study was prepared
In 1997, Professors Stephen R. Bowers and Marion T. Doss, Jr., began an
effort to promote the systematic study of the problems of political violence.
The result of their initiative was the creation in 1998 of the William R.
Nelson Institute for Public Affairs, a research and service institute that
functioned on the campus until 2005 when it was transformed into the
Center for Security and Science.
As part of an effort to advance studies of the former Soviet Union,
Bowers and Doss established a Moldova branch of their organization in
February, 2000. The operating philosophy governing the opening of the
Moldova office was that such a base would enable us to involve local
scholars in our research, thus producing internationally based studies that
would reflect both the U.S. and the non-U.S. perspectives. The first action of
Valeria Ciobanu, the Director of the Moldova office, was to contact
individuals who were involved the FSU's historic transition in a scholarly
capacity. Our early efforts enabled us to develop working relationships with
academics and professionals in Moldova, Moscow, Kazakhstan, and the
Caucasus region.

Valeria Ciobanu at the
Caucasus Forum

Valeria Ciobanu meeting
with Chechen refugees

Development of this study of the Chechen Sufi brotherhoods
demonstrates our ability to consult a wide range of scholars whose primary
insights represent a unique combination of perspectives. The primary
authors are specialists based in Russia, Moldova and the United States
(James Madison University. Their work is complemented by other
individuals residing in the former USSR.
Work on this document began in March when Valeria Ciobanu
traveled to Moscow and Kazakhstan in order to meet with people directly
involved in studies of religious brotherhoods in Chechnya. The next month,
at the invitation of the Caucasus Forum, Ms. Ciobanu participated in a
conference in Kislovodsk, Russia, that brought together representatives of
53 organizations interested in a variety of north Caucasus issues.
Most notable among those individuals who provided assistance to us
in the preparation of this study were Aslambek Aslahanov, President of the
Chechen Association, Laila Timurkayeva, of the Russian Legal Workers
Association, petroleum engineer Albert Avduev, and several members of the
Chechen diaspora in the former USSR. The analysis that follows Professor
Akhmadov's paper is, to a great extent, a result of their collective
contributions.
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Aslambek Aslahanov

Laila Timurkayeva

The Chechens

i

Johanna Nichols, “Who Are
the Chechen?”, Linguist List,
http://www.hartford hwp.com/archives/63/077.htm ,
pp. 1-2. Nichols, pp. 3-5.

In the introduction to her study “Who Are the Chechen?”, Johanna Nichols
explains that the term “Chechen” is a Russian ethnonym, based on the name
of a village, Chechen-aul, rather than the name used by these people to
describe themselves. Rather than “Chechen”, they call themselves either as
“Nokhchi” or, more frequently in recent years, as “Vainah,” a term best
translated as “my nation, my people.” Like their neighbors, the Ingush were
also given their name by the Russians. They were named after the village of
Angusht. The Ingush refer to themselves as the Ghalghay, They took this
name from an association of three major families which shared the common
surname Ghalghay. The Chechens are the largest North Caucasian group
and the second largest Caucasian group after the Georgians. Although most
Chechens are literate in Russian, at least 97% of them claim Chechen as
their first language. i
The Chechen people have occupied their north Caucasian homeland
for several millennia prior to the Russian arrival. Their society was
characterized by no social or class distinctions and the only meaningful
categories of rank were based on age, kinship and social honor. And
although they had no formal governmental structures, they saw themselves
an independent nation with their own language and territory.
Since the Russian entry into the region, the Chechens have suffered
deportations, the suppression of linguistic and religious structures, and the
attempt to destroy their culture through programs of Sovietization. The
Russian-Chechen relationship has been characterized by partnership,
periodic explosions of nationalism, violent military clashes, brutal
suppression, and economic desolation.
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Major Russian-Chechen Wars
For over six millennia, Chechens have lived in and defended their North
Caucasian homeland against the inroads of successive invaders, including
Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Buddhists, Turks and Russians. Converted to
Islam at about the same time as the Russian conquest (from the late 1500s to
mid-1800s), the Chechens have waged successive wars against the Russian
Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Republic, first to avoid conquest
and then to achieve independence. The following table illustrates the
relentless nature of this ongoing, intermittent warfare.

Synopsis of the Russian-Chechen conflicts
Period

Chechen Leader(s)

Late 1700s

Sheik Mansur Ushurma

Naqshbandi

1824-1859

Series of Imams, best
known is Sheik Imam
Shamil
Various followers of
the Chechen Ghandi,
Qadiri Sheik Kunta
Hadji Kishiev
Sheik Uzun Hadji, et al
Sheik Ali Mitaev

Naqshbandi

1864-1865,
1877, 1879,
1890s
1917-1925

Sufi Order
Involved

Hassan Izrailov

1990

President Jhokhar
Dudaev
President Jhokhar
Dudaev
President Aslan
Maskhadov
Shamil Basaev

1994-1996
1999-2000

Russians defeated in 1785
battle of Sunzha River
Short-lived Islamic state

Qadiri along
with
Naqshbandi

Contested Russian rule
through WWI

Naqshbandi
Qadiri

Uprising suppressed in
1925
Soviet purge of Sufi adepts
continues until eve of
WWII
Entire nation deported to
Siberia in 194, returned to
Chechnya in 1957. New
Sufi brotherhood Vis Hadji
or Vakhab formed during
exile
Struggle for independence
1992-1994, mobilization
War with Russia and de
facto independence
Current war begun by
Vakhab Islamic
conservatives also known
as Chechen Fighters

1929-1936

1940, 1943

Result

QuasiQadirist
QuasiQadirist
?
Vakhab
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What Is Sufism and Why Is It Important?

ii

Alexandre Benningsen and
S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics
and Commissars: Sufism in
the Soviet Union. Berkeley: U
of California P, 1985, pp. 1-2.

Chechen Zikr
iii

Edward Kline, “Chechnya
After the War”, ASF New
Documents ,
http://www.wdn.com/asf/cgi/
ASF, October, 1998,
accessed on May 1, 2000.

iv

Bennigsen and Wimbush,
pp. 85-86.

In their book Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union,
Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush argue that Sufism is an
important aspect of Islam throughout the world and is becoming
increasingly important in what was the USSR when they wrote their book.
In that study, they provide an introduction to Sufism, analyze the structure
of Sufi brotherhoods, describe the recruitment of adepts, and examine the
make-up of the brotherhoods and the inner life of those associations ii.
More recent studies have indicated that the revival of interest in
Chechen culture has been accompanied by a conversion to the Sunni branch
of Islam. Most adhere to the Sufi form of Islam and join together in
brotherhoods of 10 to 40 disciples (or disciples). They believe that
practitioners of the faith can achieve a mystical union with God through the
zikr, a ceremony that consists of a recitation of prayers that may be
accompanied by vigorous dancing that will induce an ecstatic state. Islam
did not replace traditional Chechen culture but became a part of it, thus
preserving the identity of the Chechen nation iii.
Sufism is significant because it is a popular rallying point and, to the
external world, it is not obvious who is or is not a member of these
clandestine brotherhoods. Sufism gives its adherents an organizational basis
that is somewhat like that of the early communist party during its
revolutionary stage of development. Sufism is the predominant form of
Islam in Chechnya.
During the Soviet era, authorities worked to control the formal
religious structures seen as necessary for the practice and persistence of
Islam. Consequently, there was an “official Islam,” supported by the state
but maintained at a clearly inadequate level of support. While Soviet
officials believed that this condition would lead to a deterioration of Islamic
religious life, the real impact was the nurturing of a system of “parallel
Islam” totally beyond the reach of state control. This parallel system
supported the de facto expansion of Islam during a time of anti-Islamic
policy iv.
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Kunta Hadji
There are twenty-seven religious movements operating in Chechnya today.
Kunta Hadji is one of the most important of these and is associated with the
Qadiriya brotherhood, generally regarded as the second most important of
the Soviet-era brotherhoods. As Professor Y. Z. Akhmadov explains, the
Kunta Hadji movement is the most significant form of Sufism in Chechnya.
Soviet and Czarist efforts to suppress this movement were intense.
One consequence of the suppression of the Kunta Hadji movement is that no
official portraits of Kunta Hadji exist. Professor Akhmadov recounts a
meeting that he had in Elishan-Jurt, the village in which Kunta Hadji was
born. The local murid said that during his prayers, he had a vision of Kunta
Hadji. Later, someone showed him a picture and, based on the vision from
his prayers, he declared that it was the founder of this movement. Efforts to
find an artistic conception of what Kunta Hadji looked like have been very
difficult. It is apparent that no such photograph or portrait can be found
anywhere in Chechnya or the surrounding region. Based on what initially
appeared to be a promising lead, our contacts conducted a search in
Uzbekistan but, to date, have failed to locate the Sufi saint’s picture.
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KUNTA-HADJI AND THE KUNTA-HADJISTS
The Kunta-Hadji Chechen Religious Movement
Y.Z. AKHMADOV
Chechen Academy of Sciences

1

2

Muridism – the most
militant movement in
Islam. Murids were
obliged to follow blindly
the orders of sheikhs and
imams. The extreme
expression of muridism is
the idea of “gazavat” –
the war against “nonbelievers.”

“Ustaz” – religious
teacher

In Chechnya's long history of national-liberation movements and
wars, an important role was played by events connected with the name of
the Sheik Kunta-Hadji. His name and the movement linked to it acquired
special relevance in the 1990's, when a new attempt to politicize this
religious brotherhood took place. For many people, Kunta-Hadji became the
"Chechen Gandhi."
No fearsome Chechen warrior such as Mansur, Ghazi-Mohammed,
Shamil, or even the legendary brave men Baibullat Taimiev, Bdysangur
Benoyevski, et cetera has been able to exercise such powerful influence on
the spiritual life of the Chechen people as this modest peasant-worker,
"miska" (man of God not of this world). The name of the Sheik is so holy
that people considered it a "taboo." In Chechnya, people call him "The
Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurt", "Son of Kisha", or simply "Hadji". He is
considered to have reached a "hidden state of existence" and the details
surrounding his death are not believed.
Throughout its existence, the atheist Soviet regime conducted a
fierce ideological war against the "Son of Kisha" and his followers. Despite
great effort, the Soviets lost this war; the name of the Sheik is still being
worshipped by the people of Chechnya, and the number of his followers has
grown up to this day. Currently, the number of active murids 1 (adepts) in the
Islamic brotherhood (Order) of the "Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurt", who
actively practice the dictates of the Order amounts to some 20 to 25
thousand in Chechnya. However, the total number of those who accept the
Order (i.e. recognize the Sheik as their ustaz 2, although without performing
active duties) numbers several hundred thousand followers.
Consequently, the Order of the Son of Kisha is the largest, most
influential, and, most importantly, the most dynamic, fastest growing
organization in the contemporary Chechen Republic. This allows us to
conclude that the phenomenon of the famous mid-19th century Chechen
Sheik has not yet been exhausted.
The “Hadji movement,” in both its political and religious contexts,
essentially has not been studied. While writing this article, I used facts
published by representatives of the Czarist administration —A. Ippolitov and
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G. A. Vertepov, and carefully reviewed works of authors of the Soviet and
post-Soviet periods, such as H. D. Oshayev, A. A. Salamov, A. D.
Yandarov, V. H. Akayev, and M. M. Moustafinov. It is important to note the
role of the latter author, whose doctoral dissertation on the Order of KuntaHadji and its followers has been particularly helpful. The monographic work
on Kunta-Hadji has been compiled by V.H. Akayev.
From sources related to the above-mentioned movement, we could
name documents found in various archives in Caucasian cities, particularly
Grozny, Vladikavkaz, Tbilisi, Makhachkala, as well as publications of
preachings of the "Son of Kisha" undertaken before the Soviet revolution in
the Daghestani town of Temirkhak-Shura. I have personally gathered a
small field material—local stories, legends, including video and audio
recordings.
There are also materials on the topic by several American and
British researchers—G. C. Lemercier-Quelquege, A. Benningsen, G. E. von
Grunebaum, and G. C. Trimmingham, all of whom have written on various
Sufi movements in the Caucasus and the USSR.
It is necessary to caveat this research with the following important
explanation. The author finds it impossible to characterize here the entire
complicated world of Sufi teachings, the intricacies of various currents and
theological interpretations, or to explain the phenomenon of "Sheikdoms" in
Chechnya. For that purpose, a different author should be sought, and most
likely such material would be geared towards a different audience. I would
dare to generalize by saying that nearly all contemporary researchers are
educated in the spirit of rationalistic knowledge; the religious cognition has
its own world, its own values, its own universe. In order to understand it,
one needs to accept the dogma of miracles, admit that the laws of nature are
subject to change. We limit our goals to describing the course of events
from the outside perspective of this movement, and not from the inside.
Therefore, according to our data, Kunta was born by the end of the
first third of the 19th century 3, in the family of a Chechen named Kisha from
the village Melchi-Khi (Istee-Sou). Kisha's family belonged to the clan of
Gukhoy, one of the 120 Chechen clans. This comparably small family drew
its roots from the Andic society of Daghestan, as well as from the eastern
part of Chechnya and Ichkeria. According to data from informative sources,
when the then future Sheik turned 7, his parents moved to a relatively small
village of Eliskhan-Yurt on the river Michik, which subsequently gave name
to the entire Chechen society (Michigonic).
The story goes that even prior to the birth of the future saint, various
unusual phenomena took place, which were keenly observed by his mother
Khedi. And indeed, since early childhood the boy attracted attention due to
13

3

By the time he was captured in
1864, Kunta-Hadji was 35-40
years old.

Imam Shamil
4

Imam Shamil (17971871)-religious and
secular leader of
imamate; considered to
be a legendary hero of
the Chechens and some
other ethnic groups in the
Caucasus

5

The Caucasus War
(1817-1864) resulted
in the conquest of
Caucasus by Russia

6

Imamate – theocratic in its
ideology and feudal in its
political and social structure,
this state existed in the NorthEastern Caucasus. Shamil
created an Imamate in the
territory of Chechnya and
Daghestan in the 1840s for
struggle against Russia.
Disintegrated in 1859.

7

More detailed – in the journal
“Vainakh segodnya”, N-2(4)
1997

his extraordinary natural wisdom, his ability to read people's minds, and his
ability to see into the future. At the same time, he was unable to receive a
rigorous religious education, although there are sources indicating that he
could recite the entire Koran by age 12. Establishing a family, the future
Sheik was primarily engaged in agricultural work and raising bees. His wife
was, according to certain sources, the daughter of a famous Chechen
warlord—Baibullat Taimiev ("the terror of Caucasus" in the words of the
renowned Russian poet A.S.Pushkin, who apparently was acquainted with
him), who reportedly died in the early 1830's. This fact suggests the
importance of the "Son of Kisha" in the society, despite his poverty. His
physical disability, along with his keen mind, deep religious zeal, and
exceptional gift of prophecy drew him to the teachings of Sufism, which had
already been circulating throughout the North Caucasus for some centuries.
It is known he first learned of Sufism sometime during the fourth decade of
the 19th century from a famous Nahib and Sheik Tashu-Hadji of the
Naqshband religious current. Tashu-Hadji, just like Shamil 4 himself, had
been an apprentice of Mohammed Yara, a popular preacher of the so-called
"Caucasian Muridism," which demanded of its followers to approach God
not only in prayer, but also on the battlefield as warriors against the "nonfaithful". It is quite probable that Kunta had met other Naqshband Sheiks
from Chechnya, such as Umalat-Hadji and Ghezn-Hadji, especially in the
period of the Caucasus war5.
In the meantime, the Caucasus war, which had begun yet in 1817,
was close to an end. The Imamate of Shamil 6 was showing signs of
weakness, after 25 years of resistance against Russia, a great world power at
the time7. This weakness had to do not only with external circumstances.
The problem also stemmed from the fact that the Imamate government itself
had become a burden for the mountaineers, who were unaccustomed with
the discipline of law; permanent military incursions, high taxes, and ever
increasing duties had exhausted the population. Despair and opposition were
starting to gain momentum in the Imamate.
Under these extreme circumstances, the "Son of Kisha,"
approaching the age of 30, spoke out against the policies conducted by
Shamil, calling on his followers to refrain from getting involved in worldly
issues and focus solely on prayer while seeking the mercy of God. He also
predicted the fall of the Imamate and the imprisonment of the Imam himself.
His statements, backed by the young preacher’s increasing authority, were
warmly received by this mountainous nation racked with fatigue and
hopelessness.
Imam Shamil, a person of great patience and scrupulous fairness,
responded by inviting the ascetic to his capital Vedeno several times, where
14

he was given the opportunity to dispute his convictions with the Imam's
theologians 8. Legends say the "Son of Kisha" easily baffled his opponents
with the depth of his queries. Finally, by early 1859, at Shamil's suggestion,
the refractory Chechen departed on his pilgrimage to Mecca (hadji) 9. On
August 26, 1859, surrounded by the Russian army on the Gunib-Dag
Mountain, Shamil capitulated and was sent as war prisoner to Russia 10.
One of the fundamental characteristics of the "Hadji" fraternity,
which sets it apart from the other Sufi brotherhoods of the Northern
Caucasus, is the so-called "quick" or "loud" zikr11 and a peculiar ritualistic
dance. This raises the question as to when and where did "Hadji" become
acquainted with such details of the Qadirian current of Sufism, namely the
"loud" zikr (scream of prayer, or typical Islamic call to prayer by a loud crier
(muezzin) located atop the minaret - the tower of the Mosque). Was it prior
to his pilgrimage to Mecca, or during the travels? Not even the murids can
agree on this issue.
One way or the other, during his three-year journey throughout the
Ottoman Empire, the "Son of Kisha" had the opportunity to encounter
various Sufi currents and interpretations, but it is clear that he had chosen to
concentrate of the Qadirian one12. It is true that the pre-Revolutionary author
G.A. Vertepov believed the father of the Chechen eikhrism was a follower
of the Roufai'a movement (named after its founder Sayed Ahmed Roufai'a),
which used fire in its worship, inflicting wounds using cold weapons, and so
forth. However, the practice of eikhrism in Chechnya does not confirm the
presence of such extremes.
The “Son of Kisha” had been in the Ottoman Empire between the
years 1859 and 1861, yet his correspondence was arriving in Chechnya even
before 1861. In his epistles, he preached prayer "zikr-ullah," love for one’s
neighbor, the need for earning one's bread with one's own work, helping the
poor and the orphans, the importance of abstaining from alcohol and
tobacco, forgiving one’s enemies, including those who had committed
mortal offenses, and so forth.
Upon his return from Mecca in 1861, his rating and popularity rose
considerably among the Chechen people. He was now a "Hadji", a preacher,
a prophet, whose prophecies concerning the fate of the Imamate and Shamil
had fully come true. At that time, numerous adepts soon surrounded him,
forming a religious community with a rather strong internal organization.
Soon thereafter, the "Son of Kisha" became a "Sheik", which in Chechen
terms implies holiness. He was recognized as a man, to whom the future and
the mysteries of the Universe had been revealed, and as a symbol of that, he
observed the "khalvat"—a voluntary time of fasting and prayer which could
last for many days—which he spent in a deep underground cave (still
15

8

Shamil didn’t support
Kunta-Khadji because he
wanted to preserve
muridism; he disliked the
popularity of Kunta’s
followers and their calls for
asceticism and equality.

9

This opinion is not
supported by documents.

10

More detailed in the
journal "Vainakh
segodnya," no. 2(4),
1997

11

This custom was
prohibited in imamate.

12

Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani
(1077-1166), who lived in
Iraq, is the founder of this
school of thought. In the
th
middle of the 12 century
he was well known in
Baghdad and the Islamic
world.
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General Ermolov,
supreme commander in
the Caucasus region in
1817-1827, developed a
plan for the conquest of
Caucasus, which was to
be implemented first in
Chechnya; it included the
construction of fortresses,
destruction of rebel
villages and elimination of
their inhabitants. After
Ermolov was recalled in
1827, the policy of
“elimination” continued.
More detailed – in the
journal “Vainakh
segodnya”, N1-3(7-9),
1998: Avtorkhanov A.
“Caucasus, the War of
Caucasus, and Shamil.”

preserved by his worshipers in the village of Eliskhan-Yurt).
The brotherhood was headed by the "holy teacher" himself, who
was also known as "the leading Imam". Two most trustworthy disciples,
Salman and Machik, were given the right to conduct religious services, the
so-called preaching of the Qadiri tarikat; they were also named as Sheiks.
For the ongoing administration of the fraternal Order, nahibs, vekhils,
turkhs, and tamads (supervisors) were named from among the most
prominent disciples.
The "Son of Kisha" and his representatives were demanding that
ordinary murids follow the holy rituals of the zikr, strictly abide by the
Shari'a (Islamic Law), dedicate themselves to serving God alone, and not
participate in worldly affairs. The movement quickly spread throughout the
entire Chechen territory and even into neighboring Ingushetia, the sound of
zikr was heard in every corner of the country. At the same time, along with
the rise in religious conscience based on the Order of "Hadji," a strong antigovernmental conspiracy against Imperial Russia emerged in Chechnya.
In order to gain a deep understanding of the causes that fueled this
conspiracy, we need quickly to characterize the situation created after
Russia defeated the Imamate in Chechnya.
The country had been completely ravaged by the long-lasting war;
the population in Chechnya at the beginning of this historical period was
close to 200,000 inhabitants, and after only 25 years, in the 1860's, it
numbered about 130,000. Losses from direct military actions, famine, and
epidemics amounted to at least 150-200 thousand victims. The massive and
complicated irrigation system of the Chechen plateau had been destroyed.
The strong opponent had captured all forests and half of the arable land.
The unbearable economic, physical and moral climate of constant
pressure experienced by the Chechen nation demanded resolution. The
military catastrophe and fall of the Imamate represented only a short pause
in the ongoing saga of the warrior nation. Already, by May 1860, in Eastern
Chechnya (Ikcheria) and in the heights of Argun, a new armed peasant
revolt had burst out under the leadership of former nahibs, supporters of
Shamil. By late January 1860, Czarist generals destroyed 15 auls (villages)
in Ikcheria to suppress the rebellion in Eastern Chechnya 13. Nahib Bysangur
Benoyevski had been captured, and hanged upon conviction by a militaryfield trial.
During the summer of 1861, the entire Argun okrug (region) had
been captured by the rebels under the leadership of Ouma Douev and Ata'i
Ataev. By the fall of 1861, 15 infantry battalions, 700 Cossacks, 1,900 units
of cavalry, 3 artillery divisions had conducted a revenge mission in the
mountains of Chechnya. In December 1861, the Argun insurrection had
16

been crushed, and the leaders captured and exiled to Russia.
Having been defeated in open insurrections, the patriotic forces of
Chechnya decided to take advantage of the growing religious movement of
the Son of Kisha, and carry out an nationalist uprising with the aim of
overthrowing the foreign, authoritarian regime of the conquering power,
imperial Russia.
It is important to mention that we are operating here with the notion
of the "Kunta-Hadji movement" with a certain degree of understanding. The
Sheik personally denied being a titular "spiritual leader" or Imam and,
moreover, had ceased his personal activity as a preacher, communicating
with his people through mediators. He used to characterize himself as "the
Messiah sent unto the world by the Imam (Makhdi)" to prepare the believers
for his return. In the meantime, the movement had been gradually acquiring
a more political focus and had attracted numerous supporters from among
veterans of the late Imam Shamil,, in essence all who were unhappy about
the current polity. By 1863 an especially secret leadership had developed to
challenge the czarist administration. There were lesser leaders, nahibs,
higher murids, essentially an entire hierarchy of power had been established.
Imperial forces, which by that time had already acquired significant
experience fighting the liberation movements of Caucasian nations, were
able to introduce their agents and informants within the zikrist movement.
Having known of the upcoming conspiracy, the Czarist ranks were opposing
the more orthodox mullahs and Chechen clergy, giving bribes to influential
persons in Chechen villages, and there was even a split among the masses
based on theological divergences.
On the other hand, the Czarist authorities stationed their troops in
the key locations of the Chechen plain and mountains, and strengthened
their garrisons. Without warning, on January 3, 1864, in the Shalin portion
of the Argun region, the Russians captured the "Son of Kisha" and his
brother Movsar. In no time, a special convoy transported the captives across
the mountain first to Vladikavkaz, and then to the city of Novocherkassk.
Suspecting that their "spiritual leader" was under arrest in the fortress of
Shali, several thousands of fanatically oriented murids gathered there. They
were led by Salam and Machik, the closest supporters of the Saint from
Eliskhan-Yurt. Holding a black flag, the famous Chechen cavalier Vara was
also in attendance.
By the second half of the month of January, the murids gathered
there had already sent three delegations to the prince Tumanov, commander
of the Czarist regiment in the Shalin fortress, demanding the release of the
"Son of Kisha," and were thrice denied. Then a frantic ZIKR started;
believing in Allah's intervention and the divine powers of their missing
17
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More detailed – in the
journal “Vainakh
segodnya”, no. 1-3(7-9),
1998: Said-Akhmed Isaev
“Massacre in Shali.”

spiritual leader, the immense crowd of about 3,000, including women,
dropped their guns and pistols, approaching the soldiers with revenge and
determination. The Russians responded with fire, and murids were forced to
pick up their daggers and swords, and engage in a furious attack against the
Czarist soldiers.
Under heavy artillery fire, the murids could not resist, and were
crushed quickly, over 200 were killed, and several times more were
wounded. This battle of January 18, 1864 remained in the memory of the
Chechen people as "Sha'altan T'om" - "the dagger fight of Shali" 14.
After this bloody battle, 18 of the key leaders of the murids were
captured as prisoners, and sent to hard labor camps with sentences from 5 to
8 years. Tens of active murids were exiled. Zikr and other ritual customs
were outlawed under the penalty of exile, in the mosques in all villages antizikrist preaching was read.
However, the person mostly responsible for these events, who
became a victim of the nationwide anti-governmental conspiracy, the person
who has always preached abstinence from worldly affairs and who opposed
violence as means to fight evil, preacher and ascetic, was exiled for life in
the city of Ustyuzhko in the Novgorod gubernia (province). He passed away
there on May 19, 1867, and there is evidence indicating the Sheik died of
complete exhaustion caused by famine.
In fact, zikrist believers consider that the Sheik never died, but only
passed to a "hidden", invisible state or "condition". This clearly explains the
Messianic mood, which still persists among the zikrist community.
The Imperial authorities in the Caucasus were hoping that the
massive defeat and execution of murids in the battle of Shali would end this
new religious-political movement. But this turned out to be a self-delusion,
the movement went underground, and the masses continued to revolt from
time to time. Thus in May of 1865, a villager from Kharacha, Taza
Ekmirzaev, proclaimed himself as the spiritual follower of the imprisoned
saint, and two more villages joined him in rebellion. Gathering 200-300
supporters and holding a green flag, Taza Ekmirzaev advanced at the head
of his group to the mountain of Khetash-Kort (where traditionally reunions
and national meetings were held) and proclaimed himself Imam. In turn, the
Czarist commandant immediately deployed troops for the occupation of the
strategic points in Northern Chechnya. Before their approach to the Taza
camp, the local village elite, who probably regained their sense of political
self-survival, crushed the movement.
Taza was captured, and sentenced to execution, but later the
sentence was replaced by 12 years of hard labor, and subsequent life exile in
Siberia. The Kharacha village was fined, and villagers from Elistandji were
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even forced to relocate due to their disobedience.
For several years following the above events, a powerful and
energetic warrior Vira operated in Chechnya. He started as a local warlord,
but soon after the battle of Shali was named Nahib of the Order of "the Son
of Kisha". He attempted to revive the community, and his efforts and
military feats during the partisan war that followed earned him the image of
a national hero. A set of popular songs and ballads about him circulate
throughout Chechnya. However, the death of Vara in a battle against a
Czarist detachment ended all hopes of re-establishing the political
importance of the Order.
Convinced that "the Chechen tribe" among all nationalities in the
Terskaya oblast' (region) "maintained the potential spirit of a mass
resistance," the Imperial authorities adopted a systematic, planned exile of
the Chechen mountaineers towards the frontier of the Ottoman Empire. On
the other hand, the mountaineers themselves began to emigrate as a sign of
protest against the oppressive regime that deprived them of their freedom.
During the summer of 1865, 5 thousand families, about 23 thousand people,
left Chechnya. This was a unique massive exodus from Russia by the most
energetic, freedom-loving segment of the Chechen population. This was
clearly an ethnic catastrophe for the Chechens, depriving the future nation of
its best sons. (A similar catastrophe, of even more horrible proportions, took
place in 1944, when the Stalinist regime exiled the entire Chechen nation to
Siberia, condemning it to extinction. An identical catastrophe is taking place
in Chechnya today, in the eyes of the whole world.)
Only due to their unbelievable sense of hard work and unique ability
to survive under the harshest condition has the Chechen nation managed to
escape disintegration and annihilation. Moreover, the traditional economy
and customs of the Chechen people soon were restored, villages sprang back
to life from ruins, houses, mosques, schools, a new irrigation system arose.
Chechnya soon regained its fame as "the granary" of the Northern Caucasus.
In the 9th decade of the 19th century, zikrism started to spread again
in Chechnya and among Ingushets as well, but this time only as a religious
teaching. Certain rationalistic ideas started to develop, and the system of
organization of religious brotherhoods in the villages improved.
However, the single gravitational center in the person of the living
sage had already disappeared. At the same time, especially during this
period, new Sheiks belonging to the Qadirist movement sprang up. Many
called themselves “receivers” of the Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurta. However,
they were applying changes in the rituals, which distinguished them from
the classical Kunta-Hadjist movement. Overall, such Sheiks as BamatGirey, Chin-Mirza, and Batal-Hadji exercised and continue to exercise a
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regional and village-type presence, while the muridic brotherhood of the
"Son of Kisha" embraces the entire country. Later, already in the 1950's,
under the Soviet regime, a new Order developed of the so-called Vis-Hadji "the white hats." Those consider themselves followers of Kunta-Hadji, but
are denied categorically by his true followers.
It is worth mentioning that by the early 20th century Daghestani
printing houses had published volumes of the aphorisms of the late Chechen
saint, collected by his followers.
For someone to be a follower of the "Son of Kisha" means at this
stage to essentially accept him as "a spiritual father" (teacher)—one's
representative before God. This acceptance implies to carry out a certain
number of additional prayers or formulas, such as the interpreting of the
"zikr" in the form of a loud cry with a shrill voice (with a rhythmical
repetition of the fundamental Islamic prayer "la-ilaha-il-Allah" while in an
ecstatic state running around in a circle performing a peculiar "dance"). At
the same time, the murid agrees to embrace a set of rigid moral and ethical
rules. The Order worships as holy places the tomb of his mother Khedi in
the village Hadji-aul in the Veden region of Chechnya, as well as the
remains of Sheik's courtyard in the village of Eliskhan-Yurt. We have to
mention that the Order has no unified center, each village brotherhood is led
by an elected Turkh (leader).
Zikrism was first popular among the poorest layers of Chechen
society. This is why zikrists tended to support the Bolshevik banners during
the 1918-20 civil war in Russia, often fighting against the armies of General
Denikin. The Soviet power initially flirted with the Chechen Muslims to
gain support, but soon placed believers under repression. Arrests of zikrist
became commonplace, however, as sources point out, the zikr never ceased,
not even in prisons or exile.
After the mass deportation of 1944, the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood
gained even more strength. Its growing popularity could be explained by the
great misfortune of the Chechen people: people often found hope and peace
in their systematic prayers to God and the invocation of their spiritual father,
the "Son of Kisha."
Upon the restoration of the Chechen-Ingushet Republic in 1957 and
until the beginning of Perestroika in 1985, the relations between authorities
and Kunta-Hadjists have been largely antagonistic, sometimes shifting to
alert-neutrality. The process of revival of Islamic values has led to the
intensification of Kunta-Hadjist communities, the establishment of a
religious hierarchy and growth of the number of those studying Islamic
theology.
In the fall of 1991, a group led by General J. Dudaev acceded to
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power in Chechnya. It is said to have represented the radical extreme of the
nationalist circles 15. Declaring himself as a murid of Kunta-Hadji, Dudaev
ensured his new regime a certain level of political support from the more
backward and darker side of this movement. The symbols of the "new
revolution" were zikrist mass prayers on the central streets and squares of
Grozny. However, praying on the dirty city asphalt for true murids was a
disgrace, and so it is clear that these popular "dances" were engineered by a
hired "ensemble" of individuals with no dignity and respect for the true
traditions. The Kunta-Hadjist communities soon overcame the euphoria of
"victory", and their attitude towards Dudaev and the like became more
careful. In the years of the first Chechen war (1994-96), young murids
actively protested against the violence of the federal Russian troops, and
displayed fanatical resistance.
In the aftermath of the war, the entire Chechen society was struck
by a new danger—Vakhabism. On the edge of this new fight were
particularly the Kunta-Hadjists, whose values were declared heretical by the
Vakhabits in the first place. In a series of bloody clashes occurred in villages
between young murids and Vakhabits. The zikrists declared that the
Vakhabits should be kicked out of Chechnya, and were strongly supported
by all other Sufi orders in Chechnya. This line was persistently carried out
by the Mufti (leading cleric) of Chechnya, Ahmed-Hadji Kadyrov,
belonging to the Order of the "Son of Kisha."
In July 1998 in the city of Gudermes massive fights arose between
the Vakhabits and their opponents, which led to the killing of over 100
Vakhabits. Having lost this major battle, the Vakhabits concentrated their
forces in the town of Urus-Martan, transforming it into their fortress.
The Kunta-Hadjists, on the other hand, openly supporting the
restoration of the Shari'a Islamic laws, have severely criticized president
A.Maskhadov for his ambiguous stand towards the issue of Vakhabism. For
that matter, in the current war many ordinary Kunta-Hadjists have adopted a
neutral position, or even a clear anti-Maskhadov stance, such as A.H.
Khadyrov. Their hope is that the Russians will one day leave, but the
Vakhabits want to strengthen their positions in Chechnya forever.
The Kunta-Hadjist Order in Chechnya to this day has no united
leadership, since there are no direct descendants of the Sheik. It is only
known that in Turkey resides a descendant of the Sheik's daughter, General
D.Gyunesh, former head of the joint-staff of the Turkish armies, and in
Russia dwells a descendant of the Sheik's sister—General-major I.
Suleymenov. There are rumors that descendants of Sheik's brother, Movsar,
live in Iraq. The emergence of a unifying leader could make the Order the
strongest ruling power in Chechnya. The emergence of a strong leading
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There are different opinions
among the Chechens about
the role of Dudaev in the
events of 1991-1995. Some
still consider him a national
hero.
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None of the
descendants of KuntaHadji can become the
leader of the movement
since none of them has
maintained a religious
life and their style of
living is far from the
principles advocated by
Kunta.

personality in the Order could potentially lift that individual to one of the
most significant levels of power in the country.
Paradoxically, to become leader of the Kunta-Hadjist Order in
Chechnya, and subsequently in a position to seize political power there,
would be possible only for someone like General D. Gyupesh, because he is
the only direct descendant of the Kunta-Hadji 16.
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Avduev’s Critique of Akhmadov’s Paper
One objective of our study of religious brotherhoods in Chechnya is to
promote the type of public discussions that will promote a greater
understanding of the diversity of thought in this area. A first step in this
effort was a response to Professor Akhmadov’s paper by an exiled Chechen
intellectual, Albert Avduev, who is familiar with the Vakhab movement.
The critique of the Akhmadov paper rests on several key points. A
contradiction of the historical record presented by Akhmadov is Avduev’s
first point. Kunta Hadji, Avduev argues, was not an ethnic Chechen. His
paternal ancestors came from one of the Turkish tribes in Daghestan and his
sole Chechen link was through his mother. Avduev maintains that
Akhmadov has presented a false historical record by relying upon
documents that had been falsified by the Russians and further distorted by
the ideological climate of the 19th century.
Furthermore, placing the Kunta Hadji order within the context of
Russian and, later, Soviet policy toward Islam, Avduev insists that,
following the 1864 arrest of Kunta, Russia worked to undermine traditional
Islamic beliefs and institutions in the Caucasus. The Russian objective was
to create an “official” Islam that would be sympathetic to Russian
administration of the region. By using falsified religious texts and recruiting
locals to work with Russian administrators as exponents of the new,
“official” Islam, Russian authorities believed they could effectively disarm
Islam as a weapon of resistance to their control.
Avduev maintains that, in contemporary Chechnya, the teachings of
many religious activists are completely distorted and, as a result, numerous
sects encourage animism, fanaticism, and other distortions of “true Islam”.
Such groups, he argues, are not real orders because they lack structure and
statutory organizations and they are too small (usually no more than 2000
members) to have any real impact on current developments. Moreover, such
groups have distorted religious rituals and have transformed the zikr into an
inappropriate display of screaming and dancing. The Chechen national
liberation movement does not rely upon these groups because they are seen
as having suspect connections with Russian police agencies.
Avduev explains that President Maskhadov, by contrast, has
embraced groups and individuals with connections to the Russian security
services. Referring to the Kadyrov case of 1997, Avduev argues that
President Maskhadov issued a pardon and appointed Kadyrov as mufti of
Chechnya. The evidence in the case was subsequently destroyed. An
additional indication of what Avduev sees as the suspect character of the
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Kunta Hadji order is Akhmadov’s contention that former colonel of the
Soviet Army Suleimenov, who was appointed general by Dudaev, was a
descendent of Kunta. Such an individual, with his conviction on charges of
corruption and theft prior to escaping to Moscow, could hardly claim
kinship with Kunta.
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Relevance of Religious Brotherhoods to
Current Conflict
In order to appreciate the relevance of the Kunta Hadji movement, it is
necessary to place this brotherhood within the context of other such
associations in Chechnya. As noted above, the Kunta Hadji is only one of
an estimated twenty-seven Chechen brotherhoods but, with the Vakhab
movement (also known as the Djamaat movement), it is one of the two
largest. A result of this multiplicity of religious groupings is that each has
developed an exclusive sense of community or clannishness that encourages
members to promote only their immediate “brothers”. Non-members are
regarded as being beyond the moral code that applies only within each
particular community. Consequently, corruption is not only rampant but is
also justified on the basis of religious affiliation and dogma.
One important consequence of this corruption has been an
exacerbation of tensions leading to violent clashes involving groups
identified with religious brotherhoods. An example of one such clash
occurred in 1998 in Gudermes, an industrial center which had fallen under
the control of organized crime after the first Chechen war. In this case an
armed Vahkab group known as Shariat’s Guard waged a battle against a
criminal gang that was attempting to assert control over local industrial
enterprises. The criminal gang was under the leadership of Sulim
Yamadaev, one of Chechnya’s most prominent underworld figures, and
enjoyed the patronage of Ahmed Kadirov, an important local politician. An
estimated twenty-eight people were killed during the battle and an additional
dozen died in subsequent skirmishes.
Thus, both corruption and violence have become the hallmark of
contemporary Chechen life. The deterioration of national life is reflected in
changes in the patterns of societal violence since the immediate post-Soviet
period. During the first Chechen war, there was a degree of national unity
that was reflected in the fact that almost all factions joined in fighting
against the Russians. For them, the fighting was seen as a war of national
liberation. The more recent post-Soviet years have been characterized by the
vendettas undertaken by individuals whose families were killed in early
clashes that now appear to have been futile efforts to assert national identity.
In this environment, it is not surprising that almost all sects have
armed formations, generally described as militias, which work to advance
the often-divergent interests of their particular brotherhoods. A very
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practical explanation for the appearance of such formations is that the North
Caucasus region is populated by numerous veterans who served not only in
the Soviet Army but fought in the conflicts in Abkhazia and Afghanistan.
These people have limited training beyond their military education and have
almost no civilian career options in the region's terrible economic
environment. Shamil Basaev, for example, participated in the fighting in
Abkhazia and Maskhadov served with Soviet troops that suppressed
demonstrations in the Baltic states. For such people, armed conflict provides
a natural opportunity for one of the services they can best provide.
The basis for most active of the armed groups in Chechnya is the
former members of the Shariat’s Guards, the Shariat’s "Courts", and former
members of various organs of state security. The Shariat’s Guards and the
Shariat’s Courts were organized by Chechnya’s Vakhab movement and
were composed of young men who saw themselves as being at the forefront
of the fight against criminality and corruption. The stated goal of the
Shariat’s Guard was to implement decisions made by the Shariat’s "Courts."
Those quasi-judicial decisions were intended to serve as expressions of the
Sharia, which is a specific interpretation of the Koran. The Sharia, therefore,
should be viewed as law based on the Koran. Each sect, of course, has its
own interpretation of the Koran in order to advance that sect’s specific
agenda. The overall goal of the Shariat’s Guard was to reinstate the “true
law”, which for the Vakhab movement means full equality for all men
before God and the law. In short, this was intended to be a practical code of
behavior for all followers of Islam.
Since 1997, most of the militias’ military efforts have been directed
against other sects rather than against state agencies. This situation is, in
large part, a result of the Shariat’s Guard view of itself as the true expression
of legitimate state power and the resultant necessity to direct their efforts
against other sects that challenged their legitimacy. In this, they present
themselves as being involved in the struggle against corruption and
criminality rather than as agents of religious extremism.
The religious brotherhoods have emerged as major political actors
in Chechnya and they played an important role in facilitating the demise of
the Dudaev regime. While Dudaev utilized religious appeals in advancing
his political agenda, it became obvious to serious Muslims that Dudaev's
commitment to the Kunta Hadji movement was, at best, superficial and,
more likely, insincere. This apparent hypocrisy, coupled with complaints
over his increasingly dictatorial operational style and suspicions that he was
a "Russian agent," contributed to his political decline.
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Contrast between Kunta Hadji and Vakhab
Movements
While the clashes between the various armed formations might be dismissed
as the expressions of narrow self-interest, it is essential to note that there are
important differences between the Kunta Hadji and Vakhab movements as
well as other sects operating in Chechnya.
Much of the contrast between the two main groups is based on
theology and philosophy. There are several important religious differences
that set the Kunta Hadji movement apart from the Vakhab movement. The
latter believes in general equality before the law and argues that all men
should be treated equally regardless of nationality, wealth or language. Like
most Muslims, this egalitarianism does not extend to gender issues. Women
have a subordinate place in Chechen society, whether they live in the
Vakhab or the Kunta Hadji communities. The Vakhab brotherhood is far
less clannish than the Kunta Hadji and, for that matter, other sects. The
Kunta Hadji, of course, unlike the egalitarian Vakhab, claim numerous
saints.
Again consistent with Vakhab egalitarianism, leadership positions
or functions are not inherited. They are, by contrast with the Kunta Hadji,
based on personal merit. This is closer to traditional Chechen mentality.
Their struggle against corruption is justified on the basis of their view that
there should be no favoritism or special arrangements for anyone. In the
Kunta Hadji community, leadership is inherited and closely parallels their
belief in sainthood.
In addition to these religious disputes, there are important
distinctions in terms of their respective views of Russians. The position of
the Kunta Hadji, while not identical to that of the "official" Islamic
institutions of the Soviet era, is much more supportive of Russia. Its
essentially pacifist posture creates an environment in which it is possible to
advocate a continued place for Chechnya within the Russian Federation. By
contrast, the Vakhab movement advocates the restoration of "true Islam"
and supports a struggle against domination by the Russians. They are also
openly hostile to the region's traditional Sufi Islam because of its moderation
and its incorporation of pre-Muslim traditions. For the many Russians as
well as Sufi Muslims who feel threatened by this tendency, Vakhab is
simply another word for "extremist." The Kunta Hadji followers joined the
Russians in denouncing the Vakhab movement as a great threat to
Chechnya. Interestingly, while there is considerable focus on the anti-
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Russian orientation of the Vakhab, it is important to remember that the
brotherhood maintains an equally critical view of Western society.
It is also essential to note that there is a fundamental trend that
works against stability in the North Caucasus region. It is something that can
be seen not only in Chechnya but also in Dagestan and central Asia. The
main features of this trend are: (1) a collapse of state authority, (2) a lack of
faith in state officials, (3) economic adversity, and (4) persistent intervention
by Islamic groups from abroad. The violence that came in 1999 to Dagestan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikstan was driven by these factors and the
Chechen situation is subject to the same factors.
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Connections with Taliban and Other
Outside Groups
Recognition of the fact that such an important and dynamic brotherhood
can, like other Islamic movements for national liberation, pose a challenge
to Western society prompts legitimate questions about their relationship
with Islamic organizations outside the region. While Islam did much to
provide spiritual comfort to Chechen soldiers during the 1994-96 war, it has
undergone dramatic changes during the decade since the collapse of the
USSR. Most important, open borders have made it possible for Arab
missionaries espousing a more radical form of Islam to find converts in the
Caucasus region as well as what was Soviet central Asia. The newly
converted Muslims have been increasingly hostile to Chechnya's traditional
Sufi orders and have opened the door to outside groups with more violent
tendencies.
One such organization that has attracted attention because of these
developments is the Taliban movement. While there are important
philosophical differences between Chechen religious brotherhoods and the
Taliban there are also some similarities. The essential fact, however, is that
within Chechnya there is little interest in the Taliban or, for that matter,
other such groups located abroad. The primary reason for this disinterest is
the fundamental provincialism of most Chechen movements. They see
events and actors within Chechnya and the Chechen community as of
primary importance and all others of limited relevance to their struggles.
Apparently, the Russians take the Taliban much more seriously.
Reportedly, Russian President Vladimir Putin feels Osama bin Laden and
the Taliban have supported Chechen efforts to gain their independence from
the Russian Republic and has even threatened to bomb Afghanistan if
necessary.
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For over six millennia the Chechens have defended their way of life in their
Northern Caucasus homeland. As the chart of Russian-Chechen relations
above illustrates, the history of these two valiant peoples can be
characterized as a never-ending cycle of warfare, conquest followed by an
independence movement, conquest, independence movements, and internal
dissent. Every generation of young Chechen manhood has had the
opportunity for martyrdom to the national cause. Following each
suppression of Chechen separatism, revenge accompanied by suppression
and wholesale slaughter has threatened to obliterate the Chechen culture and
way of life. All parties in this ongoing conflict have given the others ample
cause for hatred and vengeance. The tragedy of Chechnya is that this cycle
of violence seems destined to continue. Its continuation is made likely if not
probable by a variety of factors. The fact that it suffers from a weak state
structure under the control of a leadership lacking either legitimacy or the
ability to forge a consensus is one of those factors. The absence of a
popular consensus about the identity of the Chechen nation is highlighted by
the fact that while many Chechens are willing to die for freedom from
Russia, others seem perfectly content to live in Russian communities and
under Russian control elsewhere in the former USSR. Equally significant is
a regional economic collapse that has denied people an economic avenue for
advancement outside the criminal underworld. Coupled with the infusion of
a more militant form of Islam from neighboring states, these factors
guarantee that, for Chechnya, crisis is a way of life.
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